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Abstract 
How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? 
Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive 
politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We 
merge these insights in  an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding 
contextual  factors  related  to  dynamism  and  bargaining  conditions.  We  find  that  the  two 
presidential  “tools”  –  pork  and  coalition  goods  –  are  substitutable  resources,  with  pork 
functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork 







  In the early 1990s, the critique of presidentialism advanced by Linz (1994) and others 
was widely influential, and the coexistence of presidentialism with multipartism was viewed as a 
particularly  “difficult  combination.”  Multipartism  was  expected  to  exacerbate  the  “perils  of 
presidentialism” by increasing the probability of deadlock in executive-legislative relations, by 
promoting  ideological  polarization,  and  by  making  interparty  coalition  building  difficult  to 
achieve  (Mainwaring  1993;  Stepan  and  Skach  1993).  The  best  chances  for  the  survival  of 
presidential democracies, it was argued, lay in the adoption of a two-party format, which would 
reduce  polarization,  obviate  coalitional  politics,  and  promote  governability.  Yet  multiparty 
presidentialism was here to stay. This unanticipated outcome has raised questions about how 
presidents have managed this “difficult combination.” 
That multiparty presidential democracy is sustainable is now beyond dispute, yet we still 
lack a comprehensive explanation of why this is the case. The aim of this paper is to extend and 
refine recent models of multiparty presidentialism by adopting a wider perspective on the “tools” 
available  to  presidents  who  face  fragmented  legislatures.  Institutional  approaches  to  these 
questions  have  produced  promising  evidence.  As  Shugart  and  Carey  (1992)  anticipated, 
institutions  that  help  lubricate  the  machinery  of  government  often  appear  when  constitution 
writers have reasons to believe that governability will be difficult in the future. As a result, the 
structure of multiparty presidentialism does not preclude the formation of coalition governments. 
Quite to the contrary, as Cheibub (2007, 50) observes, “There is a range of possible scenarios in 
presidential systems where presidents will make coalition offers and parties will find it in their 
interest to accept them.” Coalition presidencies have in fact proven unexpectedly functional and 3 
 
durable (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004) while becoming the modal form of democracy 
in Latin America.  
  In  what  follows,  we  first  note  problems  with  applying  theoretical  models  designed 
primarily for parliamentary regimes directly to separation-of-powers regimes.  We then build on 
extant research concerning legislative support in multiparty presidential systems. In so doing, we 
integrate  two  separate  institutional  arguments  about  how  presidents  solve  the  “governability 
equation” under multipartism. The first of these arguments holds that presidents win support via 
distributive politics, particularly through the targeted transfer of pork to legislators (e.g., Ames 
2001). The second of these arguments (familiar to students of parliamentary government) claims 
that presidents secure legislative support through the judicious allocation of cabinet portfolios 
and  other  such  “coalition  goods”  (e.g.,  Amorim  Neto  2002).  Beyond  integrating  these  two 
approaches, we also complete the picture by adding considerations of dynamism and context. 
After a brief overview of the Brazilian case, we examine differences in executive strategy among 
the  last  three  Brazilian  presidents. Empirical  analysis  supports  a view  of  pork and coalition 
goods  as  substitutable  resources,  with  pork  functioning  as  a  fine-tuning  tool  that  interacts 
reciprocally  with  legislative  support.  Pork  expenditures  also  depend  upon  a  president’s 
bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats. 
 
Coalition Presidents and Policymaking 
Models regarding coalition formation in parliamentary regimes double as explanations 
for legislative support of executive policy positions. These models typically rely, though often 
implicitly,  on  assumptions  taken  straight  from  the  theory  of  responsible  party  government: 
Strong, disciplined parties provide legislative support in exchange for spots in the formal pro-4 
 
government coalition and cabinet seats. Some models focus almost exclusively on the relative 
sizes of parties in the legislature, with either purely proportional cabinet payoffs for parties in the 
government coalition (e.g., Morelli 1999; Montero 2003; Morelli and Montero 2003) or basically 
proportional payoffs with a bonus for the formateur, or coalition-proposing, party (Baron and 
Ferejohn 1987, 1989; Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere 2005). 
Other models have attempted to explain which parties in particular will be included in the 
government coalition (for excellent summaries of this line of research see Laver 1998; Martin 
and Stevenson 2001).
1 By adding consideration of party ideology to party size, these models at 
least implicitly acknowledge that support may come at lower cost from some parties as compared 
to others. Often, a rational formateur attempts to assemble a coalition just large enough to pass 
legislation but with maximum ideological agreement. The idea behind a “minimal connected 
winning coalition” (Axelrod 1970) or a minimal winning coalition with the smallest possible 
ideological range (de Swaan 1973) is that such a coalition provides for legislative success while 
also minimizing intra-coalitional transaction costs. Veto players theory (Tsebelis 2002) has also 
incorporated this logic concerning ideology. A larger number of veto players typically makes 
policy change from the status quo more difficult as preference overlap shrinks. Panel 1A of 
Figure 1 coarsely summarizes the assumptions built into traditional parliamentary models. Quite 
simply, disciplined political parties provide legislative support in return for their inclusion in the 
government. 
                                                           
1  While  Martin  and  Stevenson  (2001)  also  discuss  various  neo-institutionalist  theories  of 
coalition formation, such theories have less bearing on the issue of legislative support than do 
models utilizing party size and ideology. 5 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
These explanations of coalition formation and policymaking, based as they are on the 
constellation of Western European parliamentary regimes, prove less than ideal when applied to 
multiparty  presidential  regimes.  The separation  of  powers  makes  the  emergence  of anything 
resembling  responsible  party  government  unlikely.  Here,  the  formateur  (the  president)  must 
reach across institutional barriers meant to complicate cooperation. Electoral systems that reward 
particularistic benefits (e.g., pork) for local districts, like the single-member district rules in the 
U.S. or open-list proportional representation systems in federal regimes like Brazil, further erode 
the influence of party leadership and can reduce the importance of ideology.  
What happens, then, if parties are weaker and less disciplined and ideological preferences 
are not necessarily the primary determinant of voting decisions? In some presidential regimes, 
the lack of party loyalty and discipline means that a minimal “winning” coalition may not be 
enough to win consistently over time. Minimal winning coalitions are also suspect in that they 
give  inordinate  power  to  smaller  coalition  parties,  who  can  become  hostage  takers.  As  a 
consequence, a formateur may find it cheaper to assemble supermajorities in which no single 
partner can envision itself as the leverage point (Groseclose and Snyder 1996). In response to 
such  concerns,  two  separate  approaches  have  emerged  to  explain  how  the  executive  boosts 
voting discipline and buys additional votes in order to cobble together winning coalitions in 
multiparty, coalition-based presidential systems.  
The first approach recognizes that the success of multiparty presidentialism, with its fixed 
terms and lack of confidence votes, largely depends on what happens on a day-to-day basis 
during the executive’s constitutional term of office. The executive uses particularistic benefits on 
an ongoing basis to overcome ideological preferences in generating legislative support. Pork is 6 
 
exchanged  for  votes  in  multiparty  presidential  systems  like  Brazil  (Ames  2001;  Pereira  and 
Mueller 2004; Alston and Mueller 2006; Alston et al. 2008). As legislators are well aware, this 
access to budgetary resources increases the likelihood of their political survival (Ames 1987; 
Samuels 2002; Pereira and Renno 2003).  
A  second  approach  –  roughly  echoing  parliamentary  theories  –  has  emphasized  that 
coalition  goods  such  as  positions  in  the  pro-government  coalition  and  cabinet  are  strategic 
resources available to presidents (Martínez-Gallardo 2005). This approach has examined how 
executives may construct coalitions and cabinets in ways that maximize legislative support, even 
with  weak  and  undisciplined  parties.  In  brief,  executives  are  more  successful  in  obtaining 
support  when  constructing  majority  cabinets  that  minimize  the  presence  of  non-partisan 
ministers  and  that  distribute  cabinet  seats proportionally  among coalition  members  (Amorim 
Neto 2002, 2006; Negretto 2006). Executives may also redesign the internal structure of the 
presidency itself, using staffing and organizational reforms in ways that resemble the allocation 
of ministerial posts (Inácio 2006). These ideas are represented visually in Panel 1B of Figure 1, 
which  summarizes  the  current  state  of  research  on  executive-legislative  exchange  under 
multiparty Presidentialism. Legislative support is separately a function of coalition goods and 
pork, and the relationship with pork is reciprocal. This view incorporates more fluid ideology 
and the need for frequent exchange. 
 
The Case of Brazil 
  Brazil represents an ideal case for considering the roles of both pork and coalition goods 
in  executive-legislative  exchange.  Largely  as  a  consequence  of  its  open-list  proportional 
representation electoral system and its federal structure, Brazil has a highly-fragmented party 7 
 
system (Mainwaring 1999) in which pork is very valuable. The reduced importance of ideology 
is evident in the party-switching behavior of legislators (Melo 2004; Desposato 2006). Extreme 
multipartism means an executive must exchange robustly with the legislative branch but has 
many potential partners for doing so.
2 Further, this exchange must be ongoing. While parties in 
the pro-presidential coalition frequently vote with the announced position of party leaders in the 
aggregate (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000), coalition discipline is far from perfect (Ames 2002; 
Amorim Neto 2002). Brazilian executives must build legislative support almost from scratch 
with each new controversial proposal (Samuels 2000).     
  Just  as  significantly,  the  institutional  tools  and  resources  available  to  the  Brazilian 
executive  are  substantial  enough to  help correct  for  minority  status  and  party  fragmentation 
(Figueiredo  and  Limongi  1999;  Amorim  Neto,  Cox,  and  McCubbins  2003).  The  Brazilian 
executive’s  toolbox  is  chock-full.  Among  other  strategic  resources,  the  Brazilian  executive 
controls  the  disbursement  of  pork  to  legislators  through  the  execution  of  individual  and 
collective budgetary amendments and establishes the characteristics of her governing coalition 
(subject, of course, to certain constraints). The executive establishes the heterogeneity and size of 
the coalition and determines the proportionality of partisan representation within the cabinet, 
outcomes we refer to as “coalition goods”. Recipients of these goods may enjoy benefits such as 
                                                           
2 Since 1990 the party of the president has always held less than 25% of the seats in the lower 
house. In mid-2009 under President Lula this figure stands at 15%. 8 
 
improved ideological satisfaction, electoral advantages, prestige, enhanced representation, and 
greater checks on executive power.
3  
 
The Presidential Toolbox: Integration and Dynamism 
We  have  two  primary  objectives  in  advancing  institutional  research  on  executive-
legislative  exchange  in  multiparty  presidential  systems.  The  first  is  to  consider  jointly  the 
influence of pork and coalition goods on legislative support. Executives implement strategies 
that  utilize  multiple  tools  in  their  toolboxes.  We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  either  the 
decision-making processes or the effects of these different tools are independent of one another. 
Consequently, the current picture of executive-legislative exchange is incomplete. We aim to 
widen the analytical lens by integrating and merging the “pork” argument and the “coalition 
goods” argument. 
Our second objective is to model dynamism in this system, including temporal factors 
that  shape  the  relationship  between  coalition  goods  and  pork.  In  terms  of  dynamics,  the 
distribution of coalition goods like cabinet seats precedes the distribution of pork. This temporal 
precedence creates a disconnection between coalition goods and legislative support. In fact, our 
data show a relatively small and inverse relationship between the size of a president’s coalition 
                                                           
3  Other  reasons  for  choosing  the  Brazilian  case  are  pragmatic.  Much  of  the  research  on 
executive-legislative  exchange  in  multiparty  presidencies  has  used  the  Brazilian  case,  which 
makes our study a natural extension. Additionally, the data requirements for this type of analysis 
are  considerable.  Data  on  legislative  support,  pork, coalitions,  and  cabinets  at  different  time 
points are all necessary, and these data are available for the Brazilian case.  
 9 
 
(i.e., the number of legislative seats in the lower house) and aggregate legislative support in 
Brazil. Instead of having a direct influence, we propose that decisions about distributing coalition 
goods work indirectly on legislative support by shaping the distribution of pork. This temporal 
ordering and the fluidity of pork lead to different roles for pork and coalition goods. Executives 
are able to use pork as a fine-tuning tool in generating legislative support, after employing the 
blunt  instrument  of  distributing  coalition  goods.  To  use  a  nautical  metaphor,  the  baseline 
distribution of coalition goods charts the initial course that the presidency will follow as it sets 
the ship of government to sail, while pork acts as the “rudder” that the executive can use to make 
eventual course corrections along the way. 
How, specifically, should we expect these two types of tools to interact? In political 
systems in which voting outcomes are strongly predicted by ideology, the value of coalition 
goods exceeds the value of pork. However, when ideology is not an overwhelmingly strong 
factor, pork and coalition goods should become imperfect substitutes in the political marketplace. 
Legislators derive substantial positive utility from both types of resources, and the executive 
takes this substitutability into account in devising legislative strategies. Consequently, we should 
observe coalition goods being offered as a substitute for pork (and vice versa). 
We  also  believe  that  popular  support  for  a  president  influences  legislative  support 
indirectly by shaping pork expenditures. The president may rely on popularity to put pressure on 
or “persuade” the legislature, as in Neustadt’s (1960) seminal arguments about a president’s 
professional  reputation  (i.e.,  respect  among  other  political  elites)  and  public  prestige  (i.e., 
popularity with the public). However, legislators are unlikely to provide their support for free, 
even when facing a publicly popular executive. Instead, we should expect the price of legislative 
support to drop as the potential electoral cost of opposing a popular executive increases. As a 10 
 
consequence, a more popular president should be able to expend fewer resources to produce a 
certain  level  of  legislative  support.  Similarly,  we  anticipate  that  an  executive’s  “lame duck” 
status as he serves out the remainder of a final term leaves the executive with little bargaining 
leverage. The imminent departure of a president should decrease the effectiveness of pork and 
require greater expenditures. Both of these variables attempt to  gauge  how difficult it is for 
legislators to say “no” to the president:  more difficult when the president is riding high in the 
polls, less so when he is a lame duck. 
 Another important feature of this dynamic system is that the relationship between pork 
and legislative support is a reciprocal one. Legislators provide support after receiving pork, while 
presidents also reward legislators for their support in a post hoc manner (Pereira and Mueller 
2004; Alston and Mueller 2006). We intend to model explicitly the dynamics of this reciprocal 
relationship. Pork expenditures should affect future legislative support,  which in turn should 
affect future pork expenditures. Modeling this reciprocal relationship also requires controlling 
for  momentum  in  legislative  support  over  time.  Even  in  a  relatively  weak  ideological 
environment,  ideology  should  contribute  to  some  stability  in  legislative  support.  Further, 
executive  distribution  of  resources  (and  especially  coalition  goods)  should  have  effects  on 
legislative support that do not erode immediately. Pork expenditures should exhibit a similar 
momentum over time. Legislators come to expect a baseline of particularistic monetary benefits 
as pork distribution becomes bureaucratized and routine. The executive must also use pork to fill 





The Political Context 
We  describe  a  political  environment  in  which  legislative  voting  is  unreliable  and 
fragmented but an executive has a number of institutional tools at her disposal to build winning 
coalitions on an ongoing basis. In such an environment, the political context assumes added 
importance. For example, does the executive have the option of forging a large coalition based 
on  the  distribution  of  parties  and  preferences  in  the  legislature?  If  so,  an  executive  can 
concentrate on firming up support and discipline within the coalition. If not, an executive likely 
must direct substantial resources outside the formal coalition to build majorities, as well. As a 
consequence, while the overall patterns of exchange may stay relatively consistent, the particular 
tactics used by individual executives may vary based on the environment. 
All Brazilian presidents since 1988 have possessed roughly the same institutional tools 
but have faced different bargaining conditions and have employed different tactics in the pursuit 
of legislative success. The only instance during this time period without a clear majoritarian 
coalition was from March 1990 to October 1992 under President Fernando Collor, who governed 
with ad hoc coalitions and minority support in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower legislative 
house).  Collor’s  tactical  choices  proved  unsustainable  and  contributed  to  his  eventual 
impeachment and removal from office (Weyland 1993).   
The  first  president  in  our  analysis,  Fernando  Henrique  Cardoso  (1995-2002),  had 
palatable options for creating large coalitions.
4 Consequently, he governed in a way that more 
                                                           
4 Cardoso ran for office in 1994 as the popular architect of a successful anti-inflation plan and 
won the presidency  outright in the first round.  The 1994 elections were the  first concurrent 
elections  for  president  and  Congress  since  1950,  allowing  for  significant  pre-election 12 
 
resembled a parliamentary agenda cartel (Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003). After his 
first year in office, Cardoso’s focused center-right coalition included almost 75% of the Chamber 
of Deputies. Cardoso rewarded coalition parties with cabinet seats in a highly proportional way 
(except for his lame-duck final year) and sent a relatively small proportion of pork outside the 
formal coalition. 
The president who followed, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003-present), was in various 
ways dealt a more difficult hand. Crafting a large, homogeneous coalition would not be possible 
given the distribution of preferences in the Congress. Even Lula’s own leftist Workers’ Party 
(PT) exhibited serious internal fractures, which would be worsened by some of the conservative 
fiscal policies Lula needed to pursue. These policies would require constitutional amendments 
and 60% supermajority voting support in the legislature.  
Given the constraints in the environment, substitution between pork and coalition goods 
would assume extreme importance. Lula would need to firm up interior support with coalition 
goods and attract support from opponents with pork. Substitution was particularly evident during 
Lula’s first year, when he crafted a relatively proportional and ideologically compact cabinet to 
induce the support of the coalition parties. He increased dramatically the number of ministerial 
portfolios  and  used  the  new  posts  to  satisfy  factions  within  PT.  The  cabinet  remained 
proportional  because  the  partner  parties  held  relatively  few  seats  in  the  Chamber. 
Simultaneously, Lula sent a large proportion (nearly 76% in 2003) of the pork outside the formal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
coordination of the Cardoso alliance. In a rare feat, Cardoso’s own party won the governorship 
of  the  three  most  important  states,  and  parties  supporting  him  made  significant  gains  in 
Congress.  13 
 
coalition as an inducement for his typical ideological opponents.
5 The substitution pattern would 
continue after Lula’s first year, but in a more limited fashion. Lula’s cabinet became much less 
proportional  upon  adding  the  relatively  large  PMDB  to  the  coalition  with  little  cabinet 
compensation.     
  Our proposed relationships are summarized in Panel 1C of Figure 1, which illustrates 
how our approach simultaneously integrates and moves beyond previous lines of research on 
legislative support under multiparty presidentialism. In the theoretical model outlined in Panel 
1C, coalition goods and an executive’s bargaining leverage are major inputs that determine how 
an executive will use pork to build legislative support. 
 
Data and Methods 
The  dataset  used  in  this  analysis  consists  of  monthly  data  for  the  years  1997-2005, 
thereby including 72 months in which Fernando Henrique Cardoso served as president and 36 
months in which Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was the Brazilian chief executive. The Appendix 
provides a summary of variables used in the analysis. 
We use three-stage least squares regression (Zellner and Theil 1962) as our method of 
data analysis. We are dealing with a system of equations with a number of endogenous variables 
due to both reciprocal causation and endogenous strategic choices on the part of the executive. 
                                                           
5 The budget for 2003 was drafted by the previous administration in 2002. However, Lula had 
discretion  over  whether  he  would  actually  disburse  the  slated  earmarks.  Therefore,  while 
institutional momentum perhaps explains some of the outward spending, Lula was also explicitly 
targeting his pork expenditures. 14 
 
Three-stage  least  squares  treats  dependent  variables  and  any  other  specified  endogenous 
variables as correlated with the disturbances in the system of equations. Remaining variables are 
considered exogenous and all are used as instruments in first-stage regressions. Three-stage least 
squares also accounts for variables that are simultaneously determined with dependent variables. 
These  features  allow  direct  mapping  from  executive  decision-making  to  our  empirical 
specification. 
We use four different equations and dependent variables to establish a fuller picture of 
executive  strategy  and  effects  on  legislative  support,  including  the  importance  of bargaining 
conditions. Three of the equations have dependent variables that appear as independent variables 
(sometimes  lagged)  in  other  equations  in  the  system,  which  is  typical  of  equations  being 
analyzed with three-stage least squares. The reciprocal relationship between legislative support 
and pork also necessitates multiple equations as one would see with two-stage least squares, 
which  is  a  less  efficient  option  than  three-stage  least  squares.  Again,  while  the  final-stage 
specifications are different for each equation, the first-stage regressions all use the same full set 
of exogenous variables. 
The primary dependent variable in this analysis is Legislative support for the executive, 
which is the average percentage of legislators in the Chamber of Deputies voting with executive 
positions in a given month. We convert this variable into a proportion and then perform a logistic 
transformation to make it suitable as a dependent variable in a linear equation. The dependent 
variable  of  the  second  equation  is  Logged  amendment  expenditures,  or  the  log  of  the  total 
individual budget amendments executed for legislators in a given month (i.e., pork). Taking the 
log of this variable is driven partly by our belief that pork spending should produce diminishing 
marginal returns and partly by diagnostic evidence of non-linear effects. The Proportion spent on 15 
 
coalition (also logistically transformed for use as a dependent variable) is the proportion of total 
individual  budget  amendments  expended  by  the  executive  on  members  of  pro-presidential 
coalition parties. Finally, the fourth dependent variable is Amorim Neto’s (2002) indicator of 
Cabinet coalescence, or the overall proportionality between Chamber seat shares and cabinet 
seat shares for pro-presidential coalition parties. Autocorrelation diagnostics support assertions 
that  these  dependent  variables  are  strongly  predicted  by  their  previous  values.  In  particular, 
diagnostics suggest that the variables are subject to AR(1) processes. A one-month lag of the 
dependent variable appears in first three equations.
6  
Other goods managed by the executive appear on the right-hand side of the equations. 
Over the nine years examined in our data the institutional rules remain constant, thus relieving 
any need to control for rules in the empirical specifications.
7 Based on surveys of Brazilian 
legislators, Coalition heterogeneity is calculated as the average Sani-Sartori ideological distance 
score (Sani and Sartori 1983) of the parties in the coalition, as measured from the president’s 
                                                           
6 We do not include a lag for Cabinet coalescence because it is fundamentally a different kind of 
variable. This variable is largely static with periodic shifts corresponding to cabinet reshuffles. 
So, while previous values are predictive, the relationship is not a causal one.   
7  An  exception  is  Constitutional  Amendment  No.  16  of  June  4,  1997,  which  allowed  one 
consecutive reelection to executive posts. However, expectation of this reform antedates our time 
series. Another exception is Constitutional Amendment No. 32 of September 11, 2001, which 
restricted  the president  to  a  single reissue  of each  lapsed  decree. Pereira,  Power  and  Rennó 
(2008) observe that the effects of this constitutional reform on presidential agenda-setting powers 
were largely innocuous. 16 
 
party. The distance score for each party is weighted by the percentage of Chamber seats that it 
was contributing to the pro-presidential coalition at the time.
8 We use this measure instead of a 
blunter measure such as the ideological range of the coalition (i.e., the absolute distance from the 
leftmost to the rightmost party) because the spread from the executive seems most relevant from 
the president’s point of view. Another potential measure of the distribution of coalition goods is 
the Effective number of coalition parties, which is 1/∑si
2, where each si is the proportion of 
coalition legislative seats held by a particular coalition party in the Chamber of Deputies. This 
measure better operationalizes costs to the executive than would the raw number of parties in the 
coalition. Finally, Coalition seats is the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies held by pro-
presidential coalition parties.  
A few other independent variables appear in our system of equations. We operationalize 
Presidential popularity as the percentage of positive public evaluations of the president minus 
the percentage of negative evaluations. The dichotomous Lame duck variable takes the value of 1 
during the final year of Cardoso’s second term. Lula is a dichotomous variable indicating the 
months during the Lula Administration, while Lula’s first year is a dichotomous variable for the 
first  year  of  Lula’s  presidency.  In  addition  to  being  effective  instruments,  these  final  two 
variables also measure differences in bargaining conditions. We want to be sure that particular 
                                                           
8  Party  switching  is  common  in  Brazil,  and  interparty  migrations  mean  that  coalition  size, 
ideological heterogeneity, and cabinet coalescence undergo minor changes every month even if 
the partisan composition of the coalition remains constant.  Fortunately, we were able to obtain 
data  on  individual  party  switching  for  every  month  from  1997  through  2005  and  have 
incorporated these data into the calculation of our other variables. 17 
 
bargaining conditions are not responsible for driving the overall strategic results, so we control 
for these differences with the two Lula variables. As previously mentioned, Lula’s bargaining 
context overall diverged significantly from that of Cardoso. Additionally, certain patterns that we 
have  predicted  are  expected  to  appear  especially  strongly  during  Lula’s  first  year  in  office. 
Separating  out  that  first  year  helps  to  control  for  Lula’s  need  for  supermajorities  and  the 
exaggerated pattern of substitution, thus ensuring that the results are not being driven by a single 
year in the data. 
Figure 2 displays by cabinet the variance in the three most important variables in the 
system of equations. Despite a high average value, one can see that legislative support varies 
rather widely throughout the years examined. Furthermore, the pattern of substitution is evident 
in this figure, as relatively higher values of pork are associated with relatively lower values of 
cabinet heterogeneity and vice versa. The lame-duck nature of Cardoso’s final year (primarily 
the fourth cabinet) stands out in the figure, as well. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Results 
Table  1  displays  the  results  of  the  three-stage  least  squares  regression.  The  bottom 
dependent variable in the table is the proportionality or coalescence of the cabinet. An executive 
with the luxury of creating a coalition that includes a larger number of seats in the lower house, 
as was typically the case with Cardoso, can also afford to focus on intra-coalitional rewards like 
proportional cabinets. Also as anticipated, Lula awarded cabinet seats in a proportional manner 
during that first year as he combined the inner distribution of coalition goods with the external 
distribution of pork in pursuit of supermajorities. 18 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
The second dependent variable from the bottom is the proportion of pork that remains 
within the coalition. This equation is included in the system due to a belief that it is strongly co-
determined with the overall amount of pork; these decisions are linked in the broader executive 
strategy. As hypothesized, this proportion (logistically transformed) exhibits substantial stability 
from one month to another. Further, an executive who can feasibly assemble a larger coalition 
(in terms of seats held in the lower house) is also able to focus more of the pork within the 
coalition. The raw coalition size is not treated as endogenous in the system because it is subject 
to significant external constraints – namely the actual partisan distribution in the Chamber of 
Deputies, which in turn derives from the popular elections held in 1994, 1998, and 2002. The 
coefficient for Lula’s first year does not reach statistical significance in this equation, but this is 
largely due to its relationship with the other two independent variables.
9 Again, this variable’s 
inclusion is meant to control for the very strong substitution pattern in Lula’s first year. 
  Pork serves as the dependent variable in the second equation from the top in Table 1. 
Pork, too, is strongly influenced by its previous value. Also in line with our predictions, pork 
spending is a function of the previous level of legislative support as executives reward supportive 
behavior. An executive can convert popularity into a legislative benefit, though the relationship 
                                                           
9 The number of seats held by the coalition in that first year takes on low values in the overall 
dataset, thus creating collinearity. The lag of the dependent variable is also linked to the Lula’s 
first year variable in that it captures the month-to-month stability in internal pork expenditures in 
that first year. Lula’s first year becomes a highly effective predictor with the removal of either of 
the other independent variables from the equation. 19 
 
with legislative support is indirect. Instead, as we had suggested, a more popular executive is 
able to expend less pork in building legislative support.
10 The direction on the coefficient for 
lame  duck  status  defies our  expectations, but  the reasoning  may  be  the  same.  We  find  that 
Cardoso actually spent less during his lame-duck period, but this lower level of spending may 
have been an acknowledgement that the pork was going to buy far less. Cardoso may have 
conceded support and saved some money that final year. 
We find evidence of a substitution effect between coalition goods and pork in Brazil.
11 
Executives assembling more ideologically diverse and more proportional cabinets tend to expend 
less on pork. Our proposal, again, is that a particularistic good like pork also carries substantial 
value  in  a  country  like  Brazil,  so  pork  can  be  used  as  a  substitute  for  coalition  goods. 
Consequently, an executive can compensate for an ideologically narrower or less proportional 
cabinet through increased pork expenditures.
12 Similarly, an executive can get by with expending 
less pork when the cabinet is ideologically broader or the cabinet is more proportional. Worth 
noting is that we specify coalition heterogeneity and cabinet coalescence as contemporaneous 
                                                           
10 Presidential popularity does not directly influence legislative support in our data. 
11 We estimate separate equations using Coalition heterogeneity and the Effective number of 
coalition parties due to a correlation of 0.916 between these two variables. The results for the 
two specifications are substantively identical. 
12  Alternative  static  analyses  using  interaction  terms  support  this  story  of  substitutability. 
Graphic  representations  of  the  results  show  that  pork  has  a  greater  influence  on  legislative 
support when coalition goods are in lower supply, and vice versa. The results of these separate 
analyses are available from the authors upon request.  20 
 
with pork expenditures. While the actual distribution of pork follows the distribution of coalition 
goods, an executive attempts to fine-tune with pork expenditures based on the current state of the 
coalition. Finally, the different bargaining conditions and policymaking needs encountered by 
Lula do produce a tactical difference. After controlling for his coalition and cabinet construction, 
Lula still must spend more than anticipated on pork. We hypothesized that internal factions in 
Lula’s party, the distribution of parties in the Chamber, and other factors added up to a more 
difficult  bargaining  environment  for  Lula  and  one  that  necessitated  greater  resource 
expenditures.
13 
  The final dependent variable is legislative support. As proposed, legislative support is 
primarily a function of previous legislative support and previous pork distribution. The result 
with  respect  to  individual  amendments  (pork)  contravenes  how  some  view  the  role  of  pork 
distribution  on  legislator  behavior.  For  example,  Limongi  and  Figueiredo  (2007)  claim  that 
establishing a causal relationship between votes and pork is impossible, essentially basing their 
claim  on  descriptive  evidence in  the  form  of  a frequency  distribution. However,  time-series 
                                                           
13  This  system  of  equations,  as  specified,  does  not  directly  contemplate  the  effects  of  the 
mensalão corruption scandal, which involved illicit payments from the Lula Administration to 
legislators during the timeframe of early 2004 through May 2005. A dichotomous variable for 
that time period is not significantly related to any of the dependent variables. Most likely, the 
difficult bargaining conditions had caught up with Lula, and the illicit payments were necessary 
for  the  various  other  executive  resources  to  maintain  a  certain  level  of  effectiveness  –  a 
relationship beyond the scope of our model. 21 
 
analysis here that controls for other factors that may influence legislator voting behavior reveals 
that appropriation of pork  positively increases legislative support in Congress and vice versa. 
 
The Case of Pension Reform 
  A brief case from Lula’s trying first year illustrates results from Table 1 in an especially 
clear manner. In particular, the case of the 2003 pension reform (see Alston and Mueller 2006; 
Melo  2008)  demonstrates  the  interaction  between  pork  and  coalition  goods,  as  well  as  the 
importance  of  the  bargaining  context  and  goals.  Upon  assuming  office,  Lula  needed  to 
implement fiscally conservative policies to calm international lenders and markets and to ease 
budgetary pressures inside the country. Success, however, meant overcoming his strong leftist 
history, a severely fractured party, and rather limited ideological support in the Congress. Many 
of the necessary  measures would require constitutional amendments and a concomitant 60% 
support in the Congress. Even with highly disciplined parties (which these were not), Lula’s 
baseline support would be insufficient. Lula found himself needing to build supermajorities by 
combining partisan opponents and more leftist legislators who would dislike the policy program.  
The relative ideological fluidity in Brazil could cut both ways. Some rightist partisan 
opponents would vote against Lula’s reforms despite ideological agreement with them, while 
leftist legislators could be brought along with the proper inducements. The game would be much 
more difficult to solve than if ideology played the determinative role in voting decisions, but it 
was also possible for Lula to build the supermajorities he required – a virtual impossibility in the 
world of disciplined parties and responsible party government. 
The Lula government, like the previous Cardoso government, proposed the taxation of 
retired  worker  pensions  as  a  key  component  of  solving  the  fiscal  crisis  of  the  Brazilian 22 
 
government. The pension legislation represented an extreme departure from previous Lula and 
PT  rhetoric,  which  had  derided  any  attempts  at  pension  reform  as  “neoliberal”  and 
“technocratic,”  and  this  volte-face  created  serious  fissures  within  the  party  and  the  broader 
governing  coalition.  The  proposal  also  antagonized  many  of  the  President’s  most  important 
support groups like labor unions and civil servants. 
In the face of a difficult bargaining environment, Lula’s substitution behavior was an 
accentuated version of the pattern identified in Table 1.  As mentioned earlier, Lula assembled a 
relatively  narrow  coalition  and  proportional  cabinet  to  induce  internal  support  while  buying 
support from outside the coalition with pork. As shown in Table 2, Lula’s strategy produced the 
desired result with 74% support for the pension reforms in the Chamber of Deputies, despite only 
213 votes (about 42%) from within the coalition. Even strong partisan opponents like the centrist 
PSDB  and  the  conservative  PFL  (the  two  principal  parties  of  the  former Cardoso  coalition) 
largely went along with the initiative. Helping Lula even more than the ideological acceptability 
of  the  legislation  was  likely  the  fact  that  nearly  41%  of  the  overall  pork  was  disbursed  to 
individuals associated with PSDB and PFL alone in 2003. Similarly, about 89% of the pork 
disbursed at the state level in 2003 went to states governed by non-coalition parties, with about 
34%  of  the  total  going  to  states  governed  by  PSDB  or  PFL.  Thus,  pork  helped  Lula  –  an 
inexperienced formateur – get through his difficult first year in 2003. Only in 2004, with the 
incorporation of the PMDB, did Lula’s coalition begin to resemble its current supermajoritarian 
form. 




Summary and Discussion 
  Traditional  theories  of  government  formation  and  policymaking  describe  a  tidy 
parliamentary world in which strong and disciplined parties vote based on political ideology.  
We have examined executive-legislative exchange when such conditions are absent. As in many 
other  separation-of-powers  systems,  the  political  parties  of  Brazil  are  relatively  weak  and 
undisciplined, and political ideology is far from a deterministic force. In short, a different set of 
rules applies. 
  Figure 1 shows how our theoretical approach differs from its predecessors. Traditional 
parliamentary models assume unambiguous exchange of coalition status and cabinet seats for 
legislative  votes.  This  is  predominantly  a  one-way  relationship.  When  sufficient  legislative 
support is no longer forthcoming, a government reformation or new election creates a new start 
point. 
  Multiparty presidential regimes, for historical and institutional reasons, frequently do not 
enjoy strong and disciplined parties and cannot simply reshuffle the deck with new elections. 
Hence,  studies  of  these  regimes  have  looked  separately  at  ways  for  executives  to  use 
particularistic  goods  like  pork  to  build  support  or  ways  for  executives  to  boost  voting  with 
coalition goods. 
  By merging previous literatures on cabinet formation and distributive politics, our work 
has set the stage for a more integrated and refined view of executive-legislative exchange in 
multiparty presidential regimes. Executive strategies for using coalition goods and pork are not 
independent, nor are their effects on legislative support. The empirical evidence supports our 
proposal that an executive uses particularistic goods like pork to fine-tune legislative support 
after doling out longer-lasting coalition goods and gauging bargaining leverage based on factors 24 
 
like  popular  support  or  lame-duck  status.  While  pork  is  often  an  effective  complement  to 
coalition  goods,  institutional  arrangements  may  also  allow  pork  to  serve  as  a  substitute  in 
building  legislative  support.  Such  substitution  may  be  particularly  attractive  if  an  executive 
needs to obtain support from partisan or ideological foes. Pork is also flexible enough to permit 
ongoing adjustments as it interacts reciprocally with legislative support. 
  Executives  of  coalitional  presidencies  often  operate  in  dynamic  and  conditional 
environments. We have identified broad strategic patterns in executive-legislative exchange, but 
our comparison of specific Brazilian presidencies and the pension reforms example also reveal 
that executives may find different tactics for implementing these strategies. These tactics respond 
to the particular goals of the president and the characteristics (institutional and otherwise) of the 
bargaining environment. In our example, Lula faced a need for supermajority support with a 
minority  of  fragmented  natural  allies  in  the  legislature.  In  response  to  this  situation,  Lula 
pointedly used coalition goods to firm up support among these allies and sent pork to partisan 
opponents as a substitute. The contrasting experiences of Cardoso and Lula show that presidents 
draw on what we have called the “executive toolbox” in different ways, responding in each case 
to contextual and temporal factors. 
The part ideology plays in this drama is not a straightforward one. Ideological agreement 
does  not  automatically  imply  legislative  support,  nor  is  ideological  disagreement  a  certain 
portent  of  legislative  opposition.  Instead,  ideology  becomes  a  variable  in  a  complex  set  of 
calculations. Given the circumstances, how much does ideological agreement decrease the cost 
of support? Similarly, what is the cost of overcoming ideological disagreement? 
  We  have  joined  in  a  research  agenda  that  examines  how  institutional  arrangements 
overcome party fractionalization and the need for coalitions under multiparty presidentialism. 25 
 
Democratic equilibria frequently emerge, but surmounting the obstacles is not easy. From the 
executive’s  point  of  view,  multiparty  presidentialism  is  not  a  very  user-friendly  format.  In 
addition to acquiring the managerial skills necessary for public policy, presidents must also learn 
to  become  effective  wranglers  of  interparty  alliances  and  must  master  the  strategic, 
interdependent use of multiple resources. We have begun to understand how presidents can (or 
cannot)  achieve  all  this,  but  examinations  of  other  multiparty  systems  are  likely  to  yield 
significant insights. Even among the subset of cases with high levels of party fragmentation, the 
constitutional and partisan powers of presidents vary considerably (Shugart and Carey 1992). As 
Altman (2000) notes, the diversity among multiparty presidential systems argues strongly for 
examining theories on a rigorous country-by-country basis. 26 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1.  Three Stage Least Squares Regression 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  p ≤ 
DV: Logistically transformed legislative support 
  Logistically transformed legislative support (t 1)  0.531  0.081  0.001 
  Logged amendment expenditures (t 1)  0.096  0.039  0.014 
    Constant   1.526  0.833  0.067 
DV: Logged amendment expenditures (t 1) 
  Logged amendment expenditures (t 2)  0.305  0.081  0.001 
  Logistically transformed legislative support (t 2)  0.275  0.108  0.011 
  Coalition heterogeneity (t 1)   43.227  8.555  0.001 
  Cabinet coalescence (t 1)   0.068  0.028  0.014 
  Presidential popularity (t 1)   0.067  0.012  0.001 
  Lame duck (t 1)   4.020  0.810  0.001 
  Lula presidency (t 1)  1.987  0.488  0.001 
  Constant   24.510  2.593  0.001 
DV: Logistically transformed proportion of pork 
within coalition (t 1) 
  Logistically transformed proportion (t 2)  0.766  0.389  0.001 
  Coalition seats (t 1)  0.004  0.001  0.001 
  Lula’s first year (t 1)   0.262  0.201  0.193 
  Constant   1.066  0.409  0.009 
DV: Cabinet coalescence (t 1) 
  Coalition seats (t 1)  0.125  0.011  0.001 
    Lula’s first year (t 1)  20.236  1.945  0.001 
  Constant  12.257  4.008  0.002 
NOTES:   In addition to the three dependent variables, Coalition heterogeneity (t-1) is considered endogenous. 
The sample size is 104 months, with 4 months excluded due to the 1 month and 2 month lags at the start 
of the time series and at the start of the Lula presidency (since lagged values are not allowed to cross from 
one presidency to another). R2 for the four equations, in order, is 0.420, 0.787, 0.845, and 0.577. However, 
these values cannot be interpreted normally due to the non nesting that results from using instruments to 





Table 2.   Roll Call Votes on Social Security Reform by 
  Political Party (Aug. 2003) 
Party  Yes  No  Total 
PCdoB    7  (64%)    4  (36%)  11 
PDT    6  (50%)    6  (50%)  12 
PL    39  (100%)    0  (0%)  39 
PPS    17  (100%)    0  (0%)  17 
PSB    18  (90%)    2  (10%)  20 
PT    80  (95%)    4  (5%)  84* 
PTB    42  (84%)    8  (16%)  50 
PV    4  (80%)    1  (20%)  5 
PFL    32  (48%)    34  (52%)  66 
PMDB    49  (72%)    19  (28%)  68 
PMN    1  (100%)    0  (0%)  1 
PP    32  (70%)    14  (30%)  46 
PRONA    0  (0%)    6  (100%)  6 
PSC    1  (100%)    0  (0%)  1 
PSDB    28  (53%)    25  (47%)  53 
PSL    1   (100%)    0  (0%)  1 
Totals    357  (74%)    123  (26%)  480 
NOTES:  Pro government  coalition  parties  are  PCdoB  through  PV. 
Among  the  remaining  group,  the  PSDB  and  PFL  were  explicitly  in 
opposition to the Lula government at the time, with the remaining parties 
adopting an ambivalent stance. The government’s position for the roll call 
was “Yes.”  
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 Summary of Variables Used in Analysis (n = 104) 




Average proportion of legislators in Chamber of 
Deputies supporting executive positions on 
legislative votes in a given month 
0.735  0.150  0.409 to 0.995 
Logged amendment 
expenditures 
Natural log of total individual budget amendments 
executed in a given month for disbursement that 
calendar year or the next 
22.243  2.730  16.832 to 
26.651 
Coalition heterogeneity  Weighted average of Sani Sartori ideological  
distances for pro presidential coalition parties from 
the median of the executive’s party, adjusted for 
party switching 
0.128  0.027  0.060 to 
0.165 
Effective number of 
coalition parties 
1 / ∑si
2 , where si is the proportion of coalition 
Chamber seats held by each particular party, 
adjusted for party switching 
4.394  0.787  2.809 to 
5.820 
Cabinet coalescence  Correspondence between Chamber seat shares and 
cabinet seat shares for cabinet parties (as a %) 
56.462  8.047  37.000 to  
70.000 
Proportion spent on 
coalition (before logistic 
transformation) 
Proportion of total individual budget amendment 
expenditures spent on coalition party members 
0.626  0.232  0.071 to 
0.981 
Coalition seats  Number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies held 
by pro presidential coalition parties (out of 513 
possible), adjusted for party switching 
339.642  53.051  230.892 to 
402.400 
Presidential popularity  Percentage of positive public evaluations of the 
president minus percentage of negative evaluations 
2.733  21.678   45.000 to 
38.689 
NOTES: These values eliminate observations for the first and second months of each president’s administration. Allowing the lagged 
variables to cross administrations is theoretically suspect. 
SOURCES: Raw data on legislative support and the effective number of coalition parties came from the Secretary of the Directing 
Table  (Speaker  of  the  House)  of  Brazil’s  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  source  of  the  budgetary  data  was  the  Controladoria  de 
Orçamentos, Fiscalização e Controle do Senado Federal in Brazil. Our versions of these variables required additional calculations. The 
coalition heterogeneity variable was constructed using elite surveys of Congress in 1997, 2001, and 2005 in which legislators were 
asked to place all other parties on a left right (1 10) scale. We utilized three sources in constructing the presidential popularity variable 
– DataFolha, Vox Populi, and CNI/Ibope. Missing values were interpolated to create a full monthly time series of presidential 
popularity data, and we checked inter source reliability by performing correlational analysis of the interpolated time series. 
 
 